




Reputation reform strategies in local government: Investigating 
Denmark and Norway 
 




This article investigates reputation reform in Norwegian and Danish local government and whether 
they have the same strategy content depending on the degree of administrative involvement and 
municipality size. Political and administrative actors are likely to cultivate different types of reputation 
strategies (place or organisational reputation), which explicitly embrace the potentially diverging 
interests cultivated by the two types of actors. We use a comparative design and quantitative method 
with an empirical ambition to explore local government reputation strategies in two national contexts. 
We find that local government responses to reputation reform depend on the size of the municipality 
and the type of actors involved; the larger the municipality, the more the administration is involved. 
And the more that administrative actors are involved, the more the strategies target organisational 
reputation. The country-specific factors do not appear to be the most important determinants for 
reputation reform strategies. 
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While reputation activities originated in the private sector, they have also become very 
popular in the public sector over the last 15 years. Even bodies of local government have 
undertaken reputation reform. Local governments in Europe are currently marked by high 
reform activity (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann 2016), albeit with scarce knowledge about the 
impact that decentralised reform has on the local governments involved (Kuhlmann and 
Wayenberg 2016). Reform outcomes are assumed to differ between countries (Bouckaert and 
Kuhlmann 2016). Judging from extensive media coverage, the Scandinavian region seems to 
have a particular ‘reputation reform eagerness’ compared to the rest of Europe, and this article 
explores reputation reform in the Scandinavian context. 
 
Local government reforms may have different motivations and focuses. In a neo-institutional 
perspective, the focus is on the tendency of organisations to copy one another and to use the 
same templates in such reform practises, both across and within countries. Organisations are 
held to capture trends and reforms to demonstrate that they are ‘up to date’ and to demonstrate 
this in a similar way and that the overall organisational changes become uniform in character 
over time (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
 
Conversely, rationally oriented perspectives are more preoccupied with differences in reform 





reputation in public agencies, Carpenter (2001, 2010) has argued in a rational line. He claims 
that actors have interests and influence in reputation strategies. From this follows that 
reputation strategies may have differentiated characteristics. In this perspective, the overall 
goal for a reputation-conscious public organisation is to ensure fundamental organisational 
interests. Rather than pursuing legitimacy through imitation and adaptation to institutional 
pressure resulting in conformity, the main purpose is to identify and communicate the 
uniqueness of the organisation to ensure autonomy (Carpenter and Krause 2012). For a public 
organisation, it is therefore especially important that actors behave in a way that does not raise 
questions regarding its autonomy but rather protects and/or enhances it vis-à-vis national 
political interference and the like. 
Inspired by the reasoning in the rational perspective forwarded by Carpenter, this article aims 
to explore the relevance of agency (i.e. a purposeful way of managing reputation as opposed 
to imitation) and to explore how bodies of local government pursue reputation reforms in the 
Scandinavian context. To pursue this ambition, the article departs from a comparative 
approach, comparing Norway and Denmark by means of a quantitative dataset. Can 
conditions be identified that prompt local governments to make different choices? Do political 
and administrative actors pursue the same type of reputation strategies? Do local governments 
in Norway and Denmark pursue different reputation strategies? In answering these questions, 





and how organisations choose reputation strategies in a systematic, comparative research 
design (Wæraas, Bjørnå, and Moldenæs 2014, 1301). 
This article positions itself between two strands of Scandinavian research regarding local 
government reputation management. On the one hand, we examine the response of local 
governments to a strategy originating in the private sector in line with contributions that have 
theorised the distinctiveness of public sector organisations and the challenges that reputation 
management poses to that sector (Luoma-aho 2007; Wæraas and Byrkjeflot 2012; Frandsen, 
Johansen, and Salomonsen 2016). This ‘distinctiveness’ has mainly been dealt with in 
organisational terms. On the other hand, we will investigate the role and influence of major 
local government actors in line with contributions taking a more political, actor-oriented 
approach and investigate how local governments within the Scandinavian context perform 
reputation management (Bjørnå 2014, 2016; Salomonsen and Nielsen 2015). 
By utilising a comparative research design, we expect the administrative power, the size 
(population) of the municipality, and the differences in political and administrative motives to 
explain the variation in the choice of reputation strategies among local governments. The 
contrasting motivations of politicians and administrations is a persistent issue in the study of 
policy processes (Christensen et al. 2002; Jacobsen 1960). This article investigates reputation 
reform management as a strategy that political and administrative actors potentially pursue 
differently. We assume that politicians are eager to present themselves as innovators and 





the local government as a ‘totality’; that is, as a place. We further assume that the focus of 
administrators on reform is limited to their core interest: performing effectively within their 
task area; that is, the local government as an organisation (Carpenter and Krause 2012). 
We begin this article by defining reputation and providing an overview of discussions of 
reputation reform in local councils in Norway and Denmark. We will then present our 
hypotheses regarding a) administrative power in the two countries, b) the size and 
professionalism of the local governments, and c) the actors (i.e., the different motives of 
politicians and administrators in reputation strategies). We then present our method, design, 
and empirical findings. Finally, we discuss the effects of the power structure, the size, and the 
actors on the reputation strategies in Norwegian and Danish local governments together with 
some concluding remarks. 
 
Defining reputation 
Reputation is an intangible organisational asset that can be used in the pursuit of the 
organisation’s main goals. Reputation is defined here in terms of how stakeholders perceive 
an organisation’s ability to create value relative to its competitors (Shapiro 1983; Weigelt and 
Camerer 1988). From a generic perspective on reputation, a strong reputation can increase an 
organisation’s competitive advantage, as it may serve as a positive identification and can 





and Valdez 2009; Rindova et al. 2005; Shapiro 1983). From a public sector perspective, 
however, the aims of reputation building and management are more complex and multiple 
(see Wæraas and Maor 2015; Bjørnå and Salomonsen 2016). Rather than ‘merely’ improving 
the bottom line, cultivating a favourable image relates to the varying roles of public 
organisations. Hence, for local governments, a favourable organisational reputation signals 
that a municipality is an attractive workplace and therefore able to attract and retain qualified 
employees and/or effectively deliver high-quality public services (Wæraas, Bjørnå, and 
Moldenæs 2014). A favourable reputation for a municipality as a place is likely to bring 
growth and further settlement, as elements such as being an attractive tourist destination, a 
good business environment, a good place to live (e.g. abundant recreational opportunities) 
will attract visitors and businesses and increase resident satisfaction (Bjørnå 2014; Braun, 
Eshuis, and Klijn 2014; Källström 2016).1 
 
Setting reputation in context – the cases of Norway and Denmark 
Reputation reform is a salient topic that has been very present on the political agenda in the 
context of local government in Denmark and Norway over the past 15 years (Salomonsen and 
Nielsen 2015; Wæraas and Bjørnå 2011; Wæraas, Bjørnå, and Moldenæs 2014). Table 1 
                                                          
1 This is often referred to as ‘place branding’. The terms branding and reputation management are often used 
interchangeably but originate in two different literatures. Both concepts engage in how organisations, states, or 





provides an overview of debates related to council reputation in recent years, reflecting how 
reputation has been discussed both as an individual issue and in relation to other political 
issues in both countries. 
Table 1: Percentage of respondents reporting that reputation has been discussed as an 
individual topic or in relation to other political issues in the municipal council within the last 
two years.2 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Many international comparisons have treated the Scandinavian countries as belonging to the 
same model of local government and following similar reform trajectories in that they are 
regarded as having the same type of polity and society (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann 2016; 
Heinelt et al. 2018). From a comparative perspective, context and culture are important 
factors to consider (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann 2016; Heinelt et al. 2018; Kuhlmann and 
Wayenberg 2016). Denmark and Norway have an intertwined historical and cultural legacy, 
and they both enjoy broad discretionary authority, have systems of fiscal redistribution, and 
have a large share of public employment and expenditures (Rose and Ståhlberg 2005). The 
two countries have been more or less subjected to the same reforms and trends. 
Local bodies of government in Scandinavia are classified as a special type of system due to 
their unique administrative profile (Heinelt et al. 2018; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014; 
                                                          





Painter and Peters 2010). Scandinavian countries traditionally possess a highly decentralised 
administrative structure with politically and functionally strong local governments and a high 
degree of local autonomy (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann 2016; Schwab, Bouckaert, and 
Kuhlmann 2017). The countries differ in some respects, however, which we argue may result 
in differences in terms of how they perform reputation management. 
 
Hypotheses on administrative power, size, and politico‒administrative 
differences 
Reform outcomes are assumed to differ between countries (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann 2016). 
Formal preconditions in countries may differ. Ways of organising local governments and size 
provide for differences in administrative powers and the administrative capacity to influence 
reputation strategies. Although Denmark and Norway are very similar, we expect there to be 
differences with respect to the content of reputation reform strategies. There are, after all, 
some political-administrative differences between the Danish and Norwegian local 
governments, and individual municipalities likely interpret, clarify, and adjust reputation 
strategies differently (see Røvik 1998). 
Administrative power 
The council manager form implies that all executive functions are in the hands of the chief 





form, on the other hand, is different. Here, the mayor is clearly the political leader of the 
municipality (Mouritzen and Svara 2002; Heinelt et al. 2018). This should provide for 
powerful politicians compared to the administration. The formal organisation of the local 
government apparatus in Denmark and Norway differs to some degree. Norwegian local 
governments are organised according to a council manager form of government. While the 
local government council has the general authority over policy and sets overall political 
targets, it is restricted from detailed involvement in administrative matters. The 
implementation of political decisions and administration are delegated and firmly in the hands 
of the CAO (Mouritzen and Svara 2002; Heinelt et al. 2018). Danish local governments are 
organised according to a committee leader form. The mayor may, however, not control the 
council. The political bodies consist of the municipal or city council, the executive committee, 
and a number of standing committees, which share the executive authority (Mouritzen and 
Svara 2002, 60). The political members of the executive committees are granted decision-
making responsibility for the committee policy area(s). Civil servants are employed and 
formally supposed to act as the agents of the city council, serving the entire political board. 
Hence, the council manager form found in Norwegian local governments provides a formally 
more powerful CAO than the Danish council-manager form. We therefore expect that: 






Size and professionalism 
Municipality size has relevance to our investigation, as the administrative involvement in 
reputation strategies likely depends on the degree of administrative competencies available for 
performing reputation management. Larger local governments are widely assumed to be more 
robust and competent (Norwegian Government White Paper 2017; Ekspertutvalgets 
sluttrapport 2014). Reforms since the 1990s have contributed to the differences between the 
two countries, which may also affect how local governments go about reputation 
management. Structural reform implemented in 2007 in Denmark, which included the 
amalgamation of smaller municipalities, has meant that Danish municipalities are now larger 
than those in Norway. The median population of a Danish municipality is roughly 10 times 
that in Norway, where as of March 2017 most municipalities had fewer than 5000 inhabitants. 
Local Norwegian governments are therefore comparatively smaller, have fewer staff, and are 
therefore predictably less professionalised than in Denmark. 
Based on the assumption that larger municipalities have a more competent and robust 
administration, we expect that: 
H2. The bigger the municipality (size), the greater the administrative involvement in 
reputation-related work. 
 





The municipal leadership consists of politicians and administrators. They have different 
responsibilities and tasks. As ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’ (Allison 1969, 
711), politicians and administrators are likely to have different roles, interests, and targets for 
their reputation strategies (Bjørnå 2016; Wæraas, Moldenæs, and Bjørnå 2014). They want to 
create a flourishing business environment, attract more taxpayers, and boost tourism,as such 
elements are assets in the political ‘game’ (Bjørnå and Aarsæther 2010; Polsby 1984). The 
political actors are likely to focus on the municipality as a place for business settlement, a 
good place to live, and a tourist destination (Kotler, Haider, and Rein 1993; Papadopoulos 
2004; Salomonsen and Nielsen 2015; Wæraas, Bjørnå, and Moldenæs 2014). In order to 
uphold and gain support (and thereby positions), politicians must be attentive to interests in 
their constituency. They need to prioritise interests and develop political positions vis-à-vis 
other political parties. While disagreement and debate are part of the political raison d'être 
(Grøn and Salomonsen 2018; Korsiara-Pedersen and Pedersen 2013), this is not easily 
compatible with the core ideas in reputation management: reputation management theories 
emphasise the need for consistency regarding an organisation’s core values, identity, and 
strategy. According to theories about reputation, it is crucial to ensure loyalty to a reputation-
related project and to communicate this loyalty externally (Fombrun and van Riel 2004; 
Schultz, Antorini, and Csaba 2005). The debates and disagreement we find as part of the 
political raison d’être do not ‘fit in’. It is plausible to assume that ‘communicating with one 





strategies is likely. This has been referred to in the reputation literature as the ‘politics 
problem’ (Wæraas and Byrkjeflot 2012, 193). According to this line of reasoning, the political 
forging of a place reputation is a difficult endeavour. 
Compared to the politicians, the administration is in a simpler situation; it is expected to work 
in agreement and to have clear goals. For administrative actors, a good reputation as a service 
provider, which also includes attracting qualified employees, is a valuable resource (Carpenter 
and Krause 2012; Salomonsen and Nielsen 2015; Wæraas, Bjørnå, and Moldenæs 2014); it 
can increase public support and may also lead to additional delegated autonomy (Carpenter 
2010; Maor 2010). The administrative leadership is likely to target what they are responsible 
for in reputation strategies: the organisational reputation of the local government. The larger 
and stronger the administrative unit, the greater the probability that there will be 
organisational reputation strategies. 
Due to the contrasting interests of the political and administrative actors described above, we 
expect that: 
H3. The greater the administrative involvement in reputation work, the higher the 
priority regarding the municipality’s reputation as a good organisation. 
 





The analyses here are based on two surveys. The Norwegian survey was sent to all of the 
mayors and CAOs in Norway in 2015. The Danish survey was sent to all of the mayors of the 
98 Danish local governments and to the CAOs and persons responsible for strategic 
communications in 2013. Both surveys used 5-point Likert scales for the questions of interest 
to this study. 
Both survey designs make it possible for more than one individual to provide information 
about the municipality’s reputation strategy and the involvement of different actors. Because 
we are interested in the municipality’s reputation strategy and the actors involved (and not the 
individual responses, as such), we wanted one score per municipality per question. To achieve 
this, we used the average response of the respondents within each municipality. 
The variable representing the involvement of the administration is the average score of the 
following actors: the CAO,3 the administration/remaining members of the administration,4 the 
Head of Communications,5 and the employees/other employees.6 The variable representing 
the involvement of political actors is the average score of the mayor7 and the remaining 
members of the municipal/city council.8 
                                                          
3 ‘Rådmann/Kommunaldirektør’. 
4 ‘Adm/øvrige medl av administrasjonen’. 
5 ‘Kommunikasjonsansvarlig’. 
6 ‘Ansatte/andre medarbeidere’. 
7 ‘ordfører/borgermester’. 





To account for municipality size, we used a logarithm of the population. Log transformation 
usually makes sense when the variable only has positive values and the relative variation is 
high (Gelman and Hill 2007). 
To investigate the local governments’ reputation strategies, we created two scales inspired by 
Wæraas, Bjørnå, and Moldenæs (2014): one for place reputation and one for organisational 
reputation. The standardised Cronbach’s alphas for the scales9 lie within the range of values 
usually considered acceptable when Cronbach’s alpha is used as a reliability measure 
(Tavakol and Dennick 2011). We should note that the division between place and 
organisational reputation is more of an analytical tool than a de facto choice and that the 
choice of what to target and which strategies to use is likely affected by pragmatic 
considerations (Wæraas, Bjørnå, and Moldenæs 2014). 
After creating these scales, we calculated the difference between the two scores, which was 
used as the dependent variable in the investigation of H3; the higher the value of this variable, 
the more favoured are the organisational strategies. This allowed us to investigate the relative 
importance of the strategies. It is worth noting that there is no natural dichotomy between 
them, and it is therefore possible that both strategies are important in a municipality. 
                                                          






The questions regarding the items in the scales were posed slightly differently in the two 
surveys. The Danish questions addressed the purpose (formål) of the reputation work, 
whereas the Norwegian questions focused on the importance of certain goals in the reputation 
work. 
If the scales measured the same concept, we would expect the changes in the scales to occur 
more or less in unison. For example, if the Norwegian scale is increasing, we would also 
expect an increase if the Danish scale had been used. Thus, if we ignore the differences in 
level and focus on the changes in these scales, we should be able to use the scales 
meaningfully despite the slightly different phrasing of the underlying questions. 
Actors involved and reputation strategy in Denmark and Norway 
The table below displays the numbers of valid observations, the means, the medians, and the 
minimum and maximum values of the variables used in this article. The population variable is 
not used, but it is included to highlight the variation in municipality size on an easily 
understandable scale. The Danish local governments tend to favour a place-reputation strategy 
over an organisational strategy (‒0.49), while their Norwegian counterparts slightly favour an 
organisational strategy (0.03). This could be due to the fact that the items used in the scales 
are slightly different or could be due to real differences in the preference of strategies. This 
uncertainty is why we controlled for the level differences between the countries when 





Table 2: Summary statistics 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The correlation matrix of the variables considered is presented below. The correlations 
between the variables are quite low; hence, we avoid problems with multicollinearity. The 
highest correlation is found between the involvement of the CAO and that of the 
administration (0.62). This is hardly surprising, as the CAO is also included in the 
administration variable. 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Empirical findings 
In this section, we address the hypotheses through statistical models. The hypotheses are 
reiterated, and the models are shown and discussed. We start with the first hypothesis. 
H1: Council manager governments have a greater administrative involvement in 
reputation work. 
Given that Norwegian CAOs enjoy a more prominent position than their Danish colleagues, 
we expect Norwegian local governments to have a greater administrative involvement in 
reputation work. This hypothesis was tested with a regression with the scale of the different 





Norwegian municipalities. Norwegian municipalities have the value of 1 on the dummy 
variable, while the Danish municipalities have value 0. The coefficient is thus the difference 
in the mean involvement of the group of actors between the Norwegian and Danish 
municipalities. 
Table 4: Involvement of administrative and political actors in Norway and Denmark 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
As the first model in Table 4 shows, there is a difference between the involvement of the 
administration in reputation work in Norwegian and Danish municipalities. The 
administration is generally less involved in the Norwegian municipalities than in Denmark. 
There is no difference in the involvement of the CAOs (model 2 in Table 4), and the political 
actors (model 3 in Table 4) are slightly more involved in Norway, although the difference is 
not significant. 
H2: Given that the administration in larger local governments is more professional, we 
expect that the larger the municipality (size), the greater the administrative involvement in 
reputation work. 
As when testing H1, we ran a regression wherein the dependent variable was the average 
score of the involvement of the actors in question. We used the logarithm of the size of the 





Table 5: Municipality size and the involvement of the administration, the CAO, and political 
actors. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
As illustrated in model 4 in Table 5, there is a positive and significant relationship between 
municipality size and the involvement of the administration. This tells us that the larger the 
municipality, the more involved the administration is in the reputation work. We can also see 
that when adding size as a variable, country differences are no longer significant. This 
indicates that some of the differences observed were due to the fact that Norwegian 
municipalities are generally smaller than their Danish counterparts. When it comes to the 
relationship between political actors and municipality size, the opposite relationship is found; 
the larger the municipality, the less the involvement of political actors in reputation work. 
Again, we see that the country effect is no longer significant, indicating that the size of the 
municipality acted as a confounding factor here as well. 
H3: The greater the administrative involvement in reputation work, the higher the priority 
will be on a reputation of the municipality as a good organisation. 
 
To test the involvement hypothesis, we calculated the difference between the organisational 
reputation score and the place reputation score. This left us with the dependent variable, 





important than place reputation strategies. In contrast, values less than 0 indicate that 
organisational reputation strategies are less important than place reputation strategies. We 
included the country dummy to control for any level differences between the countries. 
Table 6: Regression of the differences between organisational reputation and place 
reputation. Larger dependent-variable values represent a higher score on organisation (as 
opposed to place). 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The models in Table 6 display the relationships between the relative importance of the 
reputation related to the organisation as opposed to the reputation stemming from the 
municipality as a place and the size of the municipality, the involvement of the 
administration, and the involvement of political actors. The models also include a dummy 
variable for country to control for country-level differences. 
We find a significant and positive relationship between the involvement of the administration 
and the degree to which the municipality favours its reputation as an organisation rather than 
as a place. This means that if the involvement of political actors remains the same and the 
involvement of the administration increases, the municipality tends to choose reputation 
strategies aimed more at promoting the municipality as a good organisation and to a lesser 





political actors and the degree to which the municipality favours the reputation of the 
organisation. However, it is not significant. 
Models 9 and 10 test whether there are any differences in the involvement of the actors and 
the degree to which organisational reputation strategies are favoured in Norwegian and 
Danish municipalities. Model 9 (Table 6) shows that the positive relationship between the 
involvement of the administration and the favouring of an organisational strategy in Denmark 
is slightly stronger than in Norway.10 However, this difference is not significant. With respect 
to the involvement of political actors (model 10 in Table 6), the relationship is slightly 
positive in Denmark and negative in Norway,11 which means that more politicians involved in 
Norway leads to less organisational focus in reputation strategies. However, none of these 
findings are significant. There does not appear to be enough evidence to conclude that there 
are any reputation-related response differences between the two countries. 
  
Discussion 
In this article, our aim was to explore municipal reputation reform management as a response 
to the call for research identifying crucial conditions for when and how organisations pursue 
reputation reform strategies. We have investigated three such conditions: We have tested, in a 
                                                          
10 Denmark: 0.243, Norway: 0.243 ‒ 0.039 = 0.204. 





comparative research design, the effects of the power structure, the size, and the actors 
involved in Danish and Norwegian local government reputation strategies. 
 
Administrative power and involvement in reputation strategies 
The CAOs in Norway have (at least formally) a more prominent position than their Danish 
colleagues. Therefore, we expected the Norwegian administration’s involvement in reputation 
work to be of greater significance than that of its Danish counterparts. The results do not 
confirm this hypothesis; rather, they contradict it: The administration in Norwegian local 
government is significantly less involved than in Denmark. 
The contradiction of Hypothesis 1 can be explained using the information presented in Table 
1. Here, we see that it is more common in Norway to discuss municipal reputation in relation 
to other topics on the agenda, whereas in Denmark it is common to bring it up as an issue unto 
itself. This indicates that reputation strategies have been treated as a more comprehensive 
strategy for Danish municipalities and that reputation reforms are more integrated in different 
task areas in Norway. An integrative approach, again, is likely to involve political 
deliberations and debate and to downplay administrative influence. An explanation for why 
the administration in Norwegian local government is less involved in reform strategies than is 
the case in Denmark is likely to be found in the fact that reputation reform processes have 
been different; this reform has been interpreted, clarified, and adjusted differently in the 





is implemented matters, as how things are done has implications for the scope of group 
involvement and influence in discussions. The contradiction of the hypothesis could also be 
interpreted as indication that a) the countries’ local administrative powers are more similar in 
practice than they are formally, and/or b) administrative powers have little influence in 
determining reputation strategies. 
 
The effect of the size of local governments and the degree of professionalism 
Due to differences in their reform history, Danish local governments are distinctly larger than 
those in Norway in population (i.e. in size). This enable us to study the next hypothesis, which 
addresses size and professionalism: We expected that the bigger the municipality, the greater 
would be the administrative involvement in reputation strategies (H2). We found the 
involvement of administrators in reputation-related work to be greater in larger local 
governments. We also found that the counter-intuitive results from the foregoing hypothesis 
lost their significance: When controlling for size, the degree of administrative involvement in 
reputation work in the two countries is quite similar. 
 
This is an interesting finding regarding the role of local government administrators in both 
Denmark and Norway: The administrative influence on reputation strategies increases with 
size. Its increased influence is likely due to the complexity in larger local government and the 





tasks renders it necessary for the administration to be more professional and to execute more 
tasks. This has led to efforts to enhance political initiatives in alternative ways. New Public 
Management (NPM) measures, including ‘management by objectives’ (MBO) and strategic 
political management, have been introduced in all of the Scandinavian countries (Kleven et al. 
2000). Such changes involve the delegation of responsibility from the political bodies to a 
professional administration. According to Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett (2014), the 
resulting complexity will make it more difficult for politicians to participate in the strategy-
formation process, which partially explains the increasing administrative influence on 
reputation strategies with increasing size. 
 
The increasing administrative influence on reputation strategies with size can also be seen as a 
result of local government communication departments. Most large local governments have 
such departments, and it is reasonable to assume that the actors comprising them contribute to 
reputation processes (Salomonsen and Nielsen 2015). A more professional administration 
with a department with expertise in issues related to communication and reputation is more 
likely to excel in work on reputation strategies. 
 
The actors in reputation management 
We find a significant, positive relationship between administrative involvement and 





strategy towards organisational reputation, which moves the reputation strategies towards 
ends that are most advantageous for administrative motives and interests (see Allison 1971; 
Carpenter 2001; Carpenter and Krause 2012; Peters 2001; Svara 2006). The more the 
administration is involved, the greater the focus on improving the quality of the 
municipality’s services and attracting qualified employees. These findings are in line with 
expectations that political and administrative actors will focus on their core activity in their 
formation of reputation strategies (Bjørnå 2014; Wæraas, Bjørnå, and Moldenæs 2014). 
 
The Norwegian and Danish engagement in reputation reform 
Contrary to what may be expected – that local government reform outcomes differ between 
countries (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann 2016) – we find that (when controlled for the size of the 
municipality) the local governments in the two countries capture the trend similarly and 
follow the same trajectories when working with reputation and brand strategies. Both 
countries are tuned to organisational reputation strategies; country-specific factors have no 
significant impact on reputation strategy content. The most likely explanation for this is the 
tendency organisations have to copy one another and to use the same sort of templates in such 
reform practises, both across and within countries (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The classical 
strife and tension between politicians and administrators is less prevalent in the reputation 
policy field (Salomonsen and Nielsen 2015), perhaps due to core reputation-related ideas such 





deemphasised and there is a common interest in good organisational performance and 
increased citizen satisfaction (see Van Ryzin 2007). Previous research on reputation work in 
Denmark and Norway shows that politicians and administrators do not differ much in 
worldviews and often work together when working on municipal reputation, pulling from 
their respective strengths (Salomonsen and Nielsen 2015; Aarsæther and Bjørnå 2017). 
However, our findings also reveal that municipal administrators play a prominent role in 
forming reputation strategies in both countries. Although the countries included in this study 
differ in some respects, their polities and societies are very similar and are part of the 
Scandinavian administrative tradition (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann 2016; Heinelt et al. 2018; 
Painter and Peters 2010), which seems to allocate a rather prominent role to the local 
administration in large local governments. The growth of municipal communication 
departments with an interest in reputation strategies has also furthered the administrative 
foothold in reputation strategy processes (Salomonsen and Nielsen 2015). And as the roles of 
the actors engaged in forming such reputation strategies are linked to the direction that the 
strategy takes, the similarity in reform response might also be explained rationally by 
administrative dominance and interests in reputation strategy formation (see Carpenter 2001; 
2010). 
 
This article is positioned between two strands of Scandinavian research regarding local 





government actors in reputation management (Bjørnå 2014, 2016; Salomonsen and Nielsen 
2015) and how local governments respond to a strategy originating in the private sector and 
the challenges that reputation management poses for the public sector (Frandsen, Johansen, 
and Salomonsen 2016; Luoma-aho 2007; Wæraas and Byrkjeflot 2012). While major 
contributors to the public reputation literature such as Carpenter (2001, 2010) have focused on 
governmental agencies, where the political level is more distant, we have focused on 
democracies. Administrative involvement in the formulation of reform policies, at least when 
it comes to reputation reform, increases with local government size. In reputation reform 
strategies, administrators in large local governments have more influence than do politicians 
on reputation strategy content. In a local democracy, this is problematic: Reputation reforms 
involve core municipal values and decisions with political impact. In a democracy, politicians 
cannot be excluded from reform processes that involve service provision and political goals 
(Bouckaert and Kuhlmann 2016; Schwab, Bouckaert, and Kuhlmann 2017), and in a 
democracy, politicians bear the ultimate responsibility and are accountable for the reform 
goals pursued and resources spent. Democracy suffers when administrative power increases 
vis-à-vis the political sphere. This seems to be the issue with increasing local government 
size, at least when local governments are pursuing reputation-reform policies. 
The article demonstrates that comparative studies of reform processes in countries with rather 
similar government structures have the potential to further our understanding of reform 





explanatory component for reform outcomes: It demonstrates that in local democratic 
organisations, politicians and administrators play different roles and have different interests 
and targets for their reputation-reform strategies. 
 
Conclusion 
Our aim in this article was to explore municipal reputation reform management and the 
relevance of agency (i.e. a purposeful way of managing reputation as opposed to imitation) in 
such reforms. This as a response to the call for research identifying crucial conditions for 
when and how organisations pursue their reputation reform strategies. We find that local 
governments respond differently in reputation-reform processes depending on the actors 
involved and municipal size. In local governments, the degree of political and administrative 
involvement matters for reputation-reform strategy content as the actor groups may have 
diverging interests. 
Contrary to what one might expect (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann 2016), we found country-
specific factors to have less impact on reputation strategy content. This can be explained by 
the fact that local governments, like other organisations, capture trends and reforms in a 
similar way to demonstrate that they are ‘up to date’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) as well as 
the major similarities in the formal structure, roles, and interests. The local government 





Heinelt et al. 2018; Painter and Peters 2010; Salomonsen and Nielsen 2015) and is likely to 
spend much time cultivating a reputation that will allow them to increase bureaucratic 
autonomy (Carpenter and Krause 2012). 
This article is an attempt to provide systematic research within the limits of the available data. 
We encourage future research to investigate whether our findings hold when other factors are 
considered. Two interesting factors to explore further could be the effect of 1) the existence 
and size of a municipal communication division and 2) the financial situation in the 
municipalities. 
Lastly, we would like to encourage the study of local government reputation reform strategies 
and the actors involved in other national contexts beyond the Scandinavian habitat. Whereas 
country differences may prove important in other studies, ours further point to the relevance 
of drawing comparisons between local governments which differ on less political but more 
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